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Blameworthiness, in the criminal law context, is conceived as the carefully calculated end 
product of discrete judgments about a transgressor’s intentionality, causal proximity to 
harm, and the harm’s foreseeability. Research in social psychology, on the other hand, 
suggests that blaming is often intuitive and automatic, driven by a natural impulsive desire to 
express and defend social values and expectations. The motivational processes that underlie 
psychological blame suggest that judgments of legal blame are influenced by factors the law 
does not always explicitly recognize or encourage. In this Article we focus on two highly 
related motivational processes – the desire to blame bad people and the desire to blame 
people whose motive for acting was bad. We report three original experiments that suggest 
that an actor’s bad motive and bad moral character can increase not only perceived blame 
and responsibility, but also perceived causal influence and intentionality. We show that 
people are motivated to think of an action as blameworthy, causal, and intentional when they 
are confronted with a person who they think has a bad character, even when the character 
information is totally unrelated to the action under scrutiny. We discuss implications for 






It is a fundamental tenet of criminal law that we do not judge the criminality of an act 
based on the character of the actor. Rather, “[t]he sun of justice shines alike for the evil and 
the good… [T]he most vicious [defendant] is presumed innocent until proven guilty.” 1 The 
purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether a person committed a criminal act, as 
opposed to whether the person is good or bad in the abstract. The prosecutor’s task is simply 
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Joshua Knobe, Jay Koehler, Stewart Macaulay, Michael McCann, Sally Merry, Pam Mueller, Esfand Nafisi, 
Bob Nelson, Jennifer Robbennolt, Arden Rowell, Jed Rubenfeld, Robert Sampson, Larry Solan, Susan Shapiro, 
Avani Sood, Nancy Staudt, and Emerson Tiller for helpful comments; to participants at workshops at Brooklyn 
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1 People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 574 (N.Y. 1840) (opinion of Justice Verplanck) (quoted in JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 1, 126 (1984)). 
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to prove that the defendant’s actions meet the statutory elements of a crime, and offense 
elements do not require proof of character. Blameworthiness, in this context, is conceived as 
the carefully calculated end product of discrete judgments about a transgressor’s 
intentionality, causal proximity to harm, and the harm’s foreseeability. The logic of criminal 
liability takes into account the particular harmful act, done with a particular mental state, 
causing a particular harmful result, and the combination of those elements determine the 
blame assigned to the offender; there is no room in this calculation for varying blame 
according to the actor’s moral character.2  
Research in social psychology, on the other hand, suggests that blaming is often 
intuitive and automatic, driven by a natural impulsive desire to express and defend social 
values and expectations. 3 Blaming serves an integral social function.4 By blaming a 
wrongdoer, we establish, enforce, and express the social boundaries and rules of our 
community.5 To this end, people are often willing to make sacrifices to punish cheaters, even 
when they themselves are not the ones who have been cheated.6 Blaming in ordinary social 
life primarily serves as an expressive social tool to sort the ‘bad’ members of society from 
the ‘good’ members of society and, thereby, to foster solidarity and cohesion among those 
who are appropriately abiding social expectations.7 In ordinary social life, an actor’s 
perceived character and reasons for acting, therefore, are of primary importance to the 
process of administering blame for a harmful action.8 
In this Article, we suggest that the legal and social psychological processes of blame 
cannot be completely divorced. Inevitably, formal legal processes of blame are informed and 
influenced by social psychological processes of blame, which often operate on a level 
beneath conscious awareness. Specifically, we suggest that perceptions of an actor’s moral 
character and motive for acting together affect our intuitions of blame, responsibility, and 
ultimately criminal liability for their harmful act. We have a natural, psychological 
inclination to punish people with bad characters and who act with bad motives; that 
inclination shapes the way that we interpret information in a formal legal proceeding in a 
process that we refer to as “motivated inculpation.” In a series of original social 
psychological experiments, we provide evidence that when people judge a harmful action 
                                                 
2 But see Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (1995) (arguing that Aristotelian 
virtue forms the basis for blame and punishment). 
3 See Emile Durkheim, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press 
1984)(suggesting that processes of blaming and punishing allow members of a society to express indignation at 
acts that offend the collective conscience, thereby affirming collective values and fostering social cohesion); 
Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as 
Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002). 
4 See J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1982); MICHAEL MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (Clarendon Press, 1997); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 
Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137 (2002); Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. 
Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633 (2007). 
5 See Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 31 (Joseph Sanders 
& V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001); Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 SCI. 998 (2007). 
6 See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third Party Third Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 EVOLUTION 
AND HUM. BEHAVIOR 63 (2004). 
7 Durkheim, supra note 3, at 64 (“Punishment is, above all, intended to have its affect on honest people.”). 
8See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1982) 
(arguing that blame and punishment are not meted for acts at all, but for the character traits indicated by those 
acts); Richard Brandt, ETHICAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICS 465-75 (1959) 
(suggesting that blameworthy actions are those that would not occur absent a bad moral character).  
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performed by bad person or performed with a bad motive, they perceive that person as more 
responsible, and the act as more causal and intentional, than when they judge an identical 
harmful action conducted by a ‘good’ person. Thus, it is possible that intuitive and automatic 
psychological blaming motivations can permeate more formal legal mechanisms of blame. 
Ultimately, this suggests that the social-psychological impulse to punish bad people who act 
with bad motives can color the legal process of blame, such that we are more likely to 
interpret the harmful action of a bad person as comporting with the statutory components of a 
crime and, in turn, as worthy of criminal condemnation and punishment.  
This Article advances research and theory in bringing to light ways in which legal 
blame is driven by psychological blaming processes. Our analysis informs essential 
normative questions regarding the extent to which legal processes ought to take into account 
the psychological factors that drive the mechanisms of blame. For example, to what extent 
and under what circumstances should a defendant’s motive for acting be admitted into 
evidence and considered in liability judgments? Can the rules of evidence effectively exclude 
information about moral character, and is exclusion of this evidence a proper goal, given how 
such information is likely used by jurors and judges? These normative lie at the heart of 
criminal adjudication; yet, they are outside the scope of this Article. These key normative 
questions can be dealt with only after we gain a deeper understanding of empirical questions 
about psychological blaming processes. This Article furthers our understanding of the 
empirical issues and provides the groundwork for normative analyses of the proper role of 
motive and character in criminal liability. 
In proceeding, we will first discuss differences between legal and psychological 
mechanisms of blame, focusing on the role that character information is understood to play 
within each paradigm. The law governing criminal trials generally attempts to purge 
character from its blaming processes in several ways. Criminal law itself, especially in its 
contemporary form, breaks the blaming process into discrete, component parts -- such as act, 
mental state, attendant circumstances, and result, leaving little room for judgments about the 
defendant’s moral character. Moreover, evidence law places strict limits on the admissibility 
of character evidence. By contrast, psychological blaming processes are strongly influenced 
by preexisting motivational factors that prompt us, as decision makers, to assign importance 
to factors (like perceived character) that are legally incidental or even irrelevant. In Part I of 
this Article, we explore the criminal law’s treatment of moral character and motive in 
liability, which we later contrast with psychological blaming processes. In doing so, we draw 
on Durkheimian punishment theory and the psychological phenomenon of motivated 
reasoning to craft our own account of how information about a transgressor’s character 
influences perceivers’ determinations of blame and responsibility. In Part II, we present a test 
of our theory in a series of three social psychological experiments in which we find that 
perceived bad moral character or bad motive can trigger an impulse to view an actor’s 
harmful conduct as more causal, intentional and blameworthy. These experimental results 
show that basic judgments of blame, responsibility, causation, and intentionality can be 
molded by motivational forces just as readily as everyday perceptions about, say, the 
adorableness of our own children or the negligible health implications of that delicious 
looking piece of cake on the table. In Part III we analyze some practical applications of our 
findings for several legal doctrines where evidence of bad moral character and motive may 
come into play, such as in determinations of proximate cause, application of the felony 
murder doctrine, and evidentiary treatment of character evidence. Finally, Part IV concludes 
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with a discussion of limitations of the current experiments, as well as directions for further 
empirical investigation. 
 
I. MORAL CHARACTER AND MOTIVE 
 
A. Motive and Character in Legal and Social Psychological Processes of Blame 
 
In general, our legal system eschews the role of character in criminal liability 
determinations, relying instead on an act-based system of inculpation.9 According to this 
view, the state’s right to impose blame on an actor derives solely from the actor’s 
commission of a prohibited act. 10 Put simply, we blame a criminal for what she did, not who 
she is.  
That being said, as human beings we are nevertheless naturally motivated to punish 
people who we see as having a bad moral character or a lasting criminal disposition. As John 
Henry Wigmore has asserted, “The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because 
our defendant is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned 
now that he is caught, is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of 
court.”11 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has warned that evidence of prior 
criminal activity to display a “propensity” to commit a crime poses a “risk that a jury will 
convict for crimes other than those charged – or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict 
anyway because a bad person deserves punishment.”12  
In an article providing empirical confirmation of this tendency, Theodore Eisenberg 
and Valerie Hans analyzed a sample of real jury cases and found that, where the evidence is 
weak or ambiguous, a jury that learns of a defendant’s prior criminal record is significantly 
more likely to convict than a jury without such knowledge.13 Earlier experimental research 
also demonstrated the influence of prior crime on likelihood of judgment of guilt. The 
experimental research suggests that the seriousness and similarity of prior crimes plays an 
important role, such that serious crimes or those similar to the crime on trial are more likely 
to lead to guilt judgments than trivial or dissimilar crimes.14 In fact, some experiments find 
                                                 
9 On the other hand, character does play an accepted role in processes of punishment. For a thoughtful 
discussion of the distinction between the role of character in phases of guilt vs. phases of punishment, see 
Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 99, 99 (1996). 
10 See, e.g., id. (“Although a defendant’s character sometimes can function as evidence of whether the defendant 
committed the alleged act with a culpable mental state, the defendant’s character is not itself a criterion or an 
element of guilt.”); see also G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 60 (Allen W. Wood 
trans., Cambridge University Press 1991)(1821)(suggesting that the commission of an act that infringes on a 
member of society is necessary and sufficient to justify the state’s imposition of criminal sanction). 
11 See WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 127.  
12 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st 
Cir. 1982)). See also Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 165, 197 (2006). 
13 Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal 
Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1357, 1380–85 (2009). 
14 See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: 
A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 753-55; Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy 
of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 37, 47 (1985); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the 
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 237-38 (1976). 
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no increased likelihood of guilt judgments when the prior crime is dissimilar to the current 
crime.15 The influence of prior similar crimes on guilt judgments seems to suggest that 
people make a simple inference about propensity that operates within a given category. For 
example, people might reason along the lines of, “Once a burglar, always a burglar.”16 But 
the delimitations of the categories employed in this regard remain unsettled in the literature; 
the relevant category might be as narrow as a particular offense, such as burglary, or as broad 
as a class of offenses, such as violent crimes. Regardless, the empirical literature provides 
fairly robust proof that evidence of defendants’ prior crimes or character flaws can 
potentially influence judgments regarding proof that the defendant committed the specific 
instance of crime in question. 
To protect against undue weight that jurors might place on prior crimes, Congress, 
state legislatures, and courts have put into place certain evidentiary safeguards that limit 
admission of evidence regarding moral character and prior crimes. For example, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence generally prohibit the admission of evidence to establish that a person has 
a bad character under Rule 404(a).17 This rule bars the prosecution from presenting evidence 
that suggests a defendant’s general immoral disposition as a strategy to demonstrate the 
likelihood that the defendant committed a specific crime. Additionally, evidence of a 
defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” is disallowed if it is being used “to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith” under Rule 404(b).18  
Despite the system’s best efforts to prevent character-based inferences from affecting 
judgments of criminal liability, some character information will still leak into a trial as 
inextricably tangled up with other accepted elements of culpability, such as actus reus and 
mens rea, and various defenses such as duress.19 In fact, Rule 404(b)’s bar against evidence 
of other crimes does not apply when the evidence is introduced to demonstrate “motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”20 For example, in Smith’s trial for unlawful gun possession, evidence that police 
also found cocaine and a large amount of cash in his car might be admissible show Smith’s 
motive for possessing the gun, i.e., to protect himself. Thus, although other crimes or bad 
acts are not admissible to prove the defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit the 
                                                 
15 See E. Gil Clary & David R. Shaffer, Another Look at the Impact of Juror Sentiments Toward Defendants on 
Juridic Decisions, 125 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 637 (1985). Howe (1991) suggests that it is similarity and not 
seriousness that does the work. Edmund S. Howe, Judged Likelihood of Different Second Crimes: A Function of 
Judged Similarity, 21 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 697 (1991). But the design of the experiment reporting this 
finding employed a within-subjects design that posed a very large series of simple propensity questions. It is 
therefore likely that the findings of this study are properly limited to what people say ought to matter, and not 
how they actually make judgments. Other studies suggest that there are two separate effects, one for similarity 
and one for seriousness. See Wissler & Saks, supra note 14. 
16 See Hans & Doob, supra note 14. 
17 FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (allowing such evidence only when it is used in specific rebuttal to evidence of good 
character submitted by the defense). 
18 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). But see FED. R. EVID. 413 (permitting admission of propensity evidence in sexual 
assault cases). 
19 However, Holmes suggests that the criminal law can more capably enforce standards of behavior to the extent 
that we separate liability from inferences of character derived from motive. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW 50 (1881) (“[W]hen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims more directly than any 
other at establishing standards of conduct… we should expect there more than elsewhere to find that the tests of 
liability are external, and independent of the degree of evil in the particular person’s motives or intentions.”). 
20 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
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crime in question,21 sometimes bad acts or crimes can be introduced to prove that the 
defendant had a special reason to commit the crime in question. In this sense, motive is 
sometimes relevant in proving criminal liability, for purposes other than showing that the 
defendant’s bad character suggests that he acted badly in the instant case. 
Motive comes in many guises here, because motive might influence decisions about 
blame for a variety of different reasons. Motive is most explicitly recognized as relevant in 
hate crimes, in which the defendant harms a victim because of a protected characteristic of 
that victim, such as disability, gender, race, etc.22 Hate crime statutes are unusual in the sense 
that motive is an element of the offense, and so must be proven in order for liability to attach. 
In other cases, motive might be admitted into evidence, but is not required as an element of 
the offense. In the example of Smith discussed earlier, motive for possessing the gun tends to 
prove that he did in fact possess the gun. The fact that Smith had a good reason for carrying 
the gun (to protect against theft of his cash and drugs) makes less plausible his claim, for 
example, that the gun was not his, or that he was not aware that it was in the car. Another 
example of permissible (but not required) use of motive is to distinguish among possible 
mental states. For example, in a murder trial, evidence that Jones was having an affair with 
the victim’s wife might be admissible to show that Jones killed the victim intentionally, 
rather than recklessly. Motive might also serve as the basis for non-liability. Examples of 
situations in which motive might lead to a defense against liability include killing in order to 
avoid being killed (i.e., self-defense justification), or driving through a red light to rush a 
dying person to a hospital (i.e., necessity justification).23 
In this way, the law sometimes permits consideration of a defendant’s motive, while 
it simultaneously disavows allowing the defendant’s moral character to influence judgments 
of blame. But, as our examples illustrate, motive and character are not always readily 
distinguishable. The information about Jones’ affair may be admissible for its relevance to 
his motive and mens rea, but this information also readily lends itself to unflattering 
inferences about Jones’ character as the kind of person who would have an affair with his 
business partner’s wife. Thus, the line between specific motive and general moral character is 
not always clear.24 
The difficulty of distinguishing between motive and character also sometimes arises 
when harm was caused unintentionally. The Model Penal Code incorporates a definition of 
recklessness that takes into account the “nature and purpose” of the defendant’s conduct, for 
purposes of determining whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a “gross deviation from 
                                                 
21 But see FED. R. EVID. 413 (permitting admission of propensity evidence in sexual assault cases). 
22 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 422.55 (a) “Hate crime” means a criminal act committed, in whole or in part, 
because of one or more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the victim: (1) Disability. (2) 
Gender. (3) Nationality. (4) Race or ethnicity. (5) Religion. (6) Sexual orientation. (7) Association with a person 
or group with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics. 
23 In addition to the issue of the role of motive in liability judgments, there is a separate question about the role 
of motive in sentencing. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
89, 90 n.1 2006-2007 (defendant’s motive is traditionally an important factor in criminal sentencing). 
24 The extent to which motive ought to influence liability and blame has been a topic of some debate. See, e.g., 
Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 673 (2004-2005) 
(motive ought to be part of criminal law to track ordinary perceptions of blame); Martin R. Gardner, The Mens 
Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635 
(evil motive is a theoretical basis for defenses like insanity or duress, but not for offense definitions); Hessick, 
id.(motive should play an expanded role in criminal punishment). 
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the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”25 
Recklessness in the Model Penal Code also involves the disregard of an “unjustifiable risk.”26 
The justifiability of the risk is determined by “considering the nature and purpose of the 
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him.”27 The same phrase is included in the 
MPC definition of negligence.28 The nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct are, in many 
situations, inextricably intertwined with the actor’s motive for acting. The defendant who 
shoots a gun into a crowd for fun is reckless because the nature and purpose of his conduct is 
unjustifiable, and so the risk he creates is unjustifiable as well. The defendant who shoots to 
try to stop a purse snatcher, on the other hand, has a stronger argument that the risk he took 
was justified. In this way, the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct can be placeholders 
for motive, and motive can be a strong signal of moral character. 
Motive, in the sense of nature and purpose of conduct that leads to unintended harm, 
does influence blame judgments as an empirical matter. Consider Mark Alicke’s series of 
experiments, which suggest that we are more likely to assign blame when a transgressor had 
a bad motive for doing an act that resulted in harm. 29 In one study, participants read about a 
man who was speeding home in the rain and negligently collided with another car, causing 
injury.30 Some people were told that the man was speeding home because he wanted to hide a 
vial of cocaine from his parents, whereas others were told that he was speeding home to hide 
an anniversary present for his parents. Judgments of blame varied systematically with the 
reason for why the driver was speeding: people who learned that he was speeding home to 
hide cocaine blamed him more than those who learned he was speeding home to hide the 
present.31 Thus, the driver’s motivation for speeding influenced lay judgments of blame. 
Alicke argues that we are inclined to blame transgressors with bad motives for acting because 
it leads to an inference that they had more control over the situation that led to the harm.32 
But Alicke’s experimentally proffered reasons for acting come with obvious concomitant 
inferences as to the actor’s underlying character: whereas we would generally make 
favorable inferences about the character of the kind of person who is motivated to plan the 
perfect surprise to honor their parents’ anniversary, we would be prone to make quite 
opposite inferences about the character of a paranoia-panicked cocaine possessor. 
It is easy to see that admissible information about a defendant’s motive could, in 
some instances, implicitly encourage inferences about the defendant’s moral character. These 
inferences are consonant with a theoretical literature on punishment and character that argues 
that inferences about moral character ought to be an integral component of legal blaming 
processes. On this view, responsibility for an action derives from the actor’s responsibility 
for his or her own character.33 Theorists within this tradition contend that a defendant only 
                                                 
25 MPC 2.02(2)(c). 
26 MPC 2.02(2)(c). 
27 Id. 
28 MPC 2.02(2)(d). 
29 See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 (1992). 
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 556 (2000). It is also 
possible to engage in motivated non-blaming. For example, only 15% of people in Arab countries believed that 
the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arabs. See Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to 
Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003). 
33 See Michael Moore, supra note 4, at 563 (describing but not endorsing this view). 
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ought to be culpable for a harmful action insofar as we can infer from the action that the 
defendant has a flawed character or a blameworthy disposition: if the action “reveals what 
sort of person he is in some respect.”34 According to this perspective, acts are only 
blameworthy to the extent that they betray an underlying character flaw in the actor.35 
Excuses, in this framework, operate to thwart the inference from action to character, thus 
blocking the attachment of blame.36 Claims of duress, necessity, or accident each derive from 
situations in which someone of good character could nevertheless find themselves engaging 
in a harmful or socially undesirable action.37  
Several contemporary theorists oppose the idea that blame derives from character, 
arguing that blame and punishment ought to be divorced from inferences about character.38 
In this Article, we theorize that character information that is wholly unrelated to the harmful 
action at issue can color the way in which factfinders’ interpret that action. Thus, our claim in 
this Article is consistent with -- but broader than -- Alicke’s culpable control theory. We 
hypothesize that people are more inclined to blame (and inclined to blame more harshly) not 
only when the actor’s reasons for acting are bad, but, more generally, when they have any 
reason to believe that the actor is a bad person. We hypothesize that, as an empirical matter, 
a bad motive for acting is not necessary for perceivers to make character-based inferences 
with respect to blame and responsibility. Rather, any unfavorable character inferences will 
suffice to motivate the inculpation of a transgressor. 
  
B. Motivated Inculpation 
 
Earlier, we raised a core concern expressed by many judges and legal scholars over 
the years: namely, that knowledge of a previous conviction biases the case against the 
defendant.39 The intuitions of Wigmore and of the Supreme Court justices regarding 
character and blame are examples of a broader phenomenon that social psychologists call 
                                                 
34 JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 126 (1970); see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL 
LAW 801 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978) (“The question [of a just conclusion of culpability] 
becomes whether a particular wrongful act is attributable either to the actor’s character or to the circumstances 
which overwhelmed his capacity for choice…”);  
35 See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 L. & PHIL. 5, 7-15 (1982) 
(arguing that actions may or may not demonstrate underlying character traits, but that blame is only appropriate 
when a socially undesirable trait can be inferred); George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 
YALE L.J. 1661, 1673-74 (1987) (“Whether an actor merits praise or blame… will depend on how it reflects on 
the agent, or on something enduring in the agent (which, following tradition, we are calling his ‘character.’”); 
NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 68 (1988) (arguing that 
“it is unfair to hold people responsible for actions which are out of character, but only fair to hold them so 
for  actions  in which  their  settled  dispositions  are  centrally  expressed”); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL 
THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICS 465-74 (1959). 
36 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 383 (1981). (“Excuses show an act is not to be attributed to 
a defect in character...”). 
37 Sendor points out that there is some corroboration of this conception of evidence in the commentaries to the 
Model Penal Code. Sendor, supra note 10, at n.7. For example, the MPC suggests that “one who kills in 
response to certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character 
deficiency than one who kills in their absence.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §210.3, at 55 (1985). 
38 See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of 
Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1027 (2004)(arguing that conclusions 
about immoral character creates a permanent criminal caste) 
39 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
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“motivated reasoning.” The general principle is that sometimes we have a preferred 
conclusion and we are motivated to assume the veracity of that conclusion, construing any 
evidence presented to us in a way that allows us to confirm our initial preference. For 
example, in a study on perceptions of risk, women who read an article claiming that caffeine 
posed a risk to women’s health were less convinced by the evidence if they themselves were 
heavy caffeine users; no such difference was found for men.40 The women who were heavy 
caffeine users had a stake in the results. They initially preferred a conclusion that allowed 
them to go on enjoying their coffee breaks, so they were motivated to discount the evidence. 
However, women who were light caffeine users, as well as men, had less reason to discount 
the evidence, so they generally did not.  
There are many ways in which serving our own interests can drive the conclusions we 
endorse.41 But having a personal stake in the results is just one source of motivation among 
many. We are also motivated to construe information before us in ways that confirm other 
previously-held biases or preconceived notions. For example, one recent study provides 
evidence that judges may misremember the facts of the case before them in ways that support 
subconsciously endorsed racial stereotypes.42 And jurors sometimes engage in motivated 
evaluation of evidence by disregarding and failing to discuss evidence that supports the 
conclusion opposite to the one they already favor.43  
A prime example of motivated reasoning in law lies in policy-biased judging. Judges 
profess to decide cases neutrally; some even profess that their role is like an umpire calling 
balls and strikes.44 Very few judges would acknowledge that they decide cases according to 
their own policy preferences. Yet there is a wealth of evidence from real cases demonstrating 
that judges decide cases according to their personal political ideology.45 In the laboratory, 
                                                 
40 See Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories, 53 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 636 (1987). 
41 See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin Camerer, Biased Judgments of 
Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV.1337 (1995); Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel 
Issacharoff, Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L. & SOC. INQ. 401 (1997); Linda Babcock 
& George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 109 (1997). 
42 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1195 (2009). 
43 Kurt A. Carlson & J. Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock Jurors, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCH.: APP. 91 (2001). 
44 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/politics/politicsspecial/12cnd-text-roberts.html 
45 See Glendon A. Schubert, THE JUDICIAL MIND (Northwestern Univ. Press, 1965); Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting 
Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 86 AMER. POLI. SCI. REV. 32 (1984) 
(finding that, in search and seizure cases, political ideology predicts outcome); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. 
Spaeth, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993) (judges’ prior 
ideological preferences strongly influence case outcomes); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of 
Supreme Court Decision-Making, 86 AMER. POLI. SCI. REV. 323 (1992); 
Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A Response, 40 AMER. J. POLI. SCI. 
1064 (1996) (judges engage in a biased decision process in which they find precedent consistent with their 
ideology more convincing than precedent that is contrary to their ideology); Eileen Braman, LAW, POLITICS, & 
PERCEPTION : HOW POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (University of Virginia Press, 2009); 
Eileen Braman, Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in Legal Decision 
Making,68 J. POLI. 308 (2006) (decisions about standing in a free speech case about abortion are influenced 
both by free speech attitudes and abortion attitudes); Richard E. Redding & N. Dicon Reppucci, Effects of 
Lawyers’ Socio-Political Attitudes on their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23 L. & 
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people predisposed to favor a policy permitting gay scout leaders judged other cases to be 
more similar if they involved a finding of illegal discrimination.46 In another study, law 
students deciding the constitutionality of a proposed change in a school district’s tax rate 
were more likely to find unconstitutionality when the proposed tax rate was inconsistent with 
their own tax policy preferences.47 This finding emerged even though the participants were 
provided with a monetary incentive to arrive at the legally correct decision. Of course, judges 
(and everyone else) who engages in motivated reasoning are generally unaware that they are 
doing so.48 For example, judges who understand that they must disregard information that is 
excluded from evidence, and genuinely attempt to ignore it, remain on the whole unable to 
refrain from being influenced by the barred information.49 
When we make a decision, we often have several goals, even if we’re not consciously 
aware of them. First, people generally want to reach the conclusion that is best supported by 
the available evidence. At the same time, other goals bias how we interpret and process this 
evidence, before we reach the conclusion. Sometimes we have initial intuitions or hypotheses 
that are driven by our pre-existing preferences.50 We then tend to reject some evidence and 
accept other evidence in a biased fashion, consistent with our preferences.51 We evaluate 
evidence according to what we already believe.52 We selectively remember some things but 
not others.53 We are influenced by factors that we ourselves regard as unjustifiable, though 
we often aren’t aware of such influence.54 This is especially true when the legitimate 
evidence is elastic – when there is more wiggle room to come out either way in the 
conclusion.55 And, when we finally allow ourselves to reach the conclusion we preferred 
from the beginning, we convince ourselves that we chose it because of the evidence, not 
because of any other goals we have.56 In sum, as Professors Hanson and Yosifon instruct, 
                                                                                                                                                       
HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1999) (personal support for death penalty influences decisions about whether particular social 
science evidence is admissible under Daubert). 
46 See Eileen Braman & Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanisms of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception in 
Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 940 (1997). 
47 See Joshua R. Furguson, Linda Babcock & Peter M. Shane, Do a Law’s Policy Implications Affect Beliefs 
about its Constitutionality? An Experimental Test, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 219 (2008) (The correct decision was 
determined by a law professor and a federal judge who independently arrived at the same ruling). 
48 See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alteration of 
Judgments, 35 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 250 (1977). 
49 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? 
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV.1251 (2005). 
50See Kunda, supra note 40. 
51See Peter H. Ditto, James A. Scepansky & Geoffrey D. Munro, Motivated Sensitivity to Preference-
Inconsistent Information, 75 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 53 (1998). 
52 See Babcock et al., 1995, supra note 41; Dan Simon, Lien B. Pham, Quang A. Le, & Keith J. Holyoak, The 
Emergence of Coherence over the Course of Decision Making, 27 J. EXP. PSYCH: LEARNING, MEMORY & 
COGNITION 1250 (2001). 
53 William M. Klein & Ziva Kunda, Maintaining Self-Serving Social Comparisons: Biased Reconstruction of 
One’s Past Behaviors, 19 PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 732 (1993). 
54Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence Judgments, 66 ORG. BEHAV. 
& HUM. DEC. PROC. 122 (1996). 
55 Id. 
56 See Ziva Kunda, The Case for motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 498 (1990); Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff 
Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased 
Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES IN EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 297 (1987). 
56 See Babcock et al., 1995, supra note 41; Simon, et al. supra note 52. 
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“The first lesson of motivated reasoning, whatever its manifestation, is that we humans tend 
to hold beliefs and reach judgments and conclusions that we desire, and we vastly 
underappreciate that tendency – particularly in ourselves.”57 
We are especially prone to engage in motivated reasoning when we hold strong 
opinions on a complex issue. Under these circumstances, we examine relevant evidence in a 
biased manner, accepting favorable evidence at face value, while critically evaluating and 
discounting unfavorable evidence.58 Sometimes we hold strong opinions about judgments 
involving justice – for example, we read about a heinous crime in the newspaper and feel 
strongly that the criminal ought to be harshly punished. In our own day-to-day lives, beliefs 
about justice and motivations to seek just outcomes can influence what we remember. We 
may adjust memories of past events to maintain a belief that people get what they deserve.59 
For example, people asked to recall the value of a lottery prize remember a smaller amount 
awarded when the winner was a bad person, compared to a good person.60 Indeed, biased 
recall can extend to memories about ourselves as well as others. In one study, people who 
received a lucky break (a prize awarded by random numbers) were able to later recall more 
good deeds from their own past than those who had not been lucky.61 Analogously, when we 
are prompted to think of ourselves as a bad person, then we tend to think that we had it 
coming if fate then deals us a bad hand. For example, people who were asked to recall bad 
deeds from their past were more accepting of their fate later when they were forced to spend 
25 minutes on a mind numbing task, compared to people who recalled bad deeds of other 
people.62 These studies suggest that we naturally inflate or devalue our conception of our 
own selves to see our fate as just and fair.  
 So how does the phenomenon of motivated reasoning relate to judgments of criminal 
liability? We contend that people harbor a generalized social preference to inculpate people 
with bad characters.63 In understanding this initial preference, it is useful to consider 
Durkheim’s account of the social function of crime and punishment. Attaching blame for a 
crime, according to Durkheim, performs a necessary expressive social function, allowing 
members of society to affirm and protect collective values. In punishing, says Durkheim, “we 
are avenging… the outrage to morality.”64 And by blaming and punishing, according to 
Durkheim, we are effectively differentiating ourselves from members of the society who are 
                                                 
57 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, 
Power Economics and Deep Capture, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 129, 138 (2003). 
58 Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of 
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979). 
59 See also Babcock, Loewenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 41. 
60 Mitchell J. Callan, Aaron C. Kay, Nicolas Davidenko & John H. Ellard, The Effects of Justice Motivation on 
Memory for Self- and Other-Relevant Events, 45 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 614 (2009). 
61 Id. Conversely, those who had not received the lucky break were able to recall more bad deeds from their past 
than those who had received the lucky break. 
62 Id. (Experiment 4). 
63 A related claim is that, in assessing blameworthiness, we tend to infer personality traits from behavior. Thus, 
we reason, if Smith injured Jones, it must be because Smith is a bad person. At the same time, we tend to ignore 
or give insufficient weight to situational pressures that might have led Smith to injure Jones. Donald Dripps 
calls this the “Fundamental Retribution Error.” See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: 
Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (2003). Our focus in this Article 
is different: we examine the influence of information about character that is apart from the act itself, including 
reasons for acting (Experiments 1 and 2), or even information about character that is independent of the act 
(Experiment 3).  
64 Durkheim, supra note 3, at 47. 
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not appropriately conforming to societal expectations, symbolically separating the ‘bad’ 
members of society from the ‘good’ members of society.65 Inculpation of the wicked thus 
serves simultaneously as an expression of the solidarity of honest men and a reaffirmation of 
the values and expectations of the collectivity.  
Durkheim’s theory of punishment as a social tool ultimately suggests that we are 
naturally driven to inculpate and punish a person who we believe is not properly embracing 
and conforming to our collective moral code. Pairing this innate initial desire with the 
literature on motivated reasoning, when we are confronted with the complex task to assign 
blame for an allegedly criminal action within a formal, legal proceeding, we should be 
motivated to construe the information before us in a way that best allows us to reach our 
desired conclusion and punish a bad person. This leads to the hypothesis at the heart of the 
phenomenon that we call motivated inculpation: if a person has any reason to infer that a 
defendant has a bad moral character, that person will be more likely to construe the 
defendant’s action as criminally culpable. Moreover, although formal legal proceedings try to 
dissuade character-based judgments by having factfinders focus on discrete elements of the 
act at issue when assigning blame, the research on motivated reasoning suggests that peoples’ 
initial preference to blame bad actors would likely color the way in which they interpret all 
elements of the crime. Thus, we hypothesize that when a factfinder judges a harmful action 
to be performed by ‘bad’ defendant or performed with a bad motive, the defendant is 
perceived as more responsible, and the act as more causal and intentional, than when a 
factfinder judges an identical harmful action conducted by a ‘good’ defendant. 
  
II. EXPERIMENTS: MORAL CHARACTER AND BLAME 
 
In the experiments we conducted for this Article, we tested the idea that judgments 
about the underlying elements of criminal liability can be colored by initial inferences about 
the defendant’s moral character, derived from information about the defendant’s motive for 
acting or on character information that is wholly unrelated to the harmful act at issue. Thus, 
we explore the notion that, just as judges may decide some cases according to their own 
policy preferences, ordinary people can be motivated to blame a transgressor on the basis of 
perceived moral character. In the experiments presented here, we focus on situations in 
which the causal contribution of a transgressor’s act is tenuous, and mens rea is weak or 
absent. By minimizing intentionality and causal connection, we are better able to observe the 
role of perceived moral character in blame attributions. We hypothesize that the perceived 
moral character of a transgressor will influence judgments of not only blame and 
responsibility, but also of mens rea and causality.66 That is, when observers size someone up 
as a bad person, they will not only be more likely to blame that bad person for any harm, but 
they are also more likely to judge the act as more causal and the mental state as more 
culpable. Below, we summarize the results of three experiments we conducted to test the role 
of information regarding moral character in blame attributions for criminal offenses. Then we 
briefly discuss some of the implications of our findings for criminal law doctrines of felony 
murder, inchoate offense, causation, and the evidentiary admissibility of character evidence.  
 
                                                 
65 Id. at 64. 
66 Alicke, supra note 29, found that that the driver rushing home to hide the crack vial was perceived as playing 
a greater causal role in the accident than the driver rushing home to hide the anniversary present.  
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A. Experiment 1: Frank Brady and the Firefighters 
 
We conducted this preliminary experiment to test the hypothesis that bad moral character 
influences perceptions of blame, responsibility, causation, and the like, for a bad outcome, 
holding constant mens rea and actus reus. We recruited a group of adults to answer an online 
questionnaire in which we presented a brief vignette loosely based on the case of California 
v. Brady.67 In that case, the defendant was found criminally liable for the death of two 
firefighters after a trailer, which he used as a methamphetamine lab, exploded. In the 
vignette, we varied the contents of the trailer (methamphetamines or highly flammable 
fertilizer), to examine the effect of the defendants’ character on subsequent judgments of 




We recruited 205 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service, 
which allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population of users online. We paid 
participants 50 cents for completing the survey, which took about 5 minutes. Participants 
were assured that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying information 
would not be collected. Seventeen participants were excluded because of missing data. Of the 
remaining, 63% were female, with a mean age of about 37 years. Seventy-nine percent 
identified themselves as White, 6% as Black, 5% as Hispanic, 5% as Asian Pacific, 2% as 
South Asian, and 3% as Other. Fifteen percent were full-time students, and 8% were part-
time students. Seventy percent were college educated. Ninety-five percent had lived in the 
U.S. for at least 12 years. For 56% of the sample, their household income was less than 
$50,000 per year. Politically, 48% identified themselves as liberal or very liberal; 28% 
identified as moderate, and 25% identified as conservative or very conservative. 
 
2. Design and materials 
 
We randomly divided participants into two groups. One group read the “orchids” 
version, and one group read the “meth” version of the vignette reproduced below: 
 
Frank Brady lost control of a campfire that he had built on his property and it spread to a trailer he 
kept on the premises. He used the trailer  
[Orchids:] to store highly flammable fertilizers to care for his collection of exotic plants in his 
orchid greenhouse. 
[Meth:] as a methamphetamine laboratory where he used highly flammable chemicals to make 
illegal drugs.  
When the fire made contact with the [chemicals]/[fertilizers] in the trailer, it caused a huge 
explosion and raged out of control. Four firefighter pilots in helicopters and air tankers were called 
in to try and put the fire out by dousing it from overhead. During the sixth trip up to douse the fire, 
one of the pilots approached from the wrong direction and collided with another helicopter. Two 
pilots were killed in the collision. 
 
Each participant read either the Orchids or the Meth version of the vignette, but not 
both. After reading the vignette, participants were asked to provide their own personal 
opinion about Frank Brady and his role in the death of the two pilots: to what extent he is 
                                                 
67 California v. Brady, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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responsible; how negatively he should be judged; how much he is to blame; to what extent he 
caused the deaths; how intentional were his actions; how foreseeable the deaths were from 
Frank Brady’s perspective; the extent to which he was careless; and how likeable he is. All 
questions were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The order of 
presentation of these questions was random. 
Participants were then asked to think about the pilot who flew in the wrong direction. 
Participants were asked their personal opinions about the pilot’s role in the collision: to what 
extent he was responsible; how negatively he should be judged; how much he is to blame; 
and the extent to which he caused the collision. All questions were measured on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Again, the order of presentation of these 




a. Judgments of Frank Brady 
 
Participants in the Meth condition judged Frank Brady to be more responsible,69 
blameworthy,70 and worthy of negative judgment71 for the death of the two pilots, compared 
to participants in the Orchids condition, as illustrated in Figure 1. In addition to ultimate 
judgments about blame and responsibility, other, more basic perceptions varied according to 
the contents of the trailer. Despite the fact that all participants learned that the fertilizer/drugs 
were “highly flammable,” the participants in the Meth condition perceived Frank Brady’s 
actions to be more of a cause of the pilots’ deaths than participants in the Orchids 
condition,72 also illustrated in Figure 1.  
                                                 
68 All analyses were conducted using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) unless otherwise noted. An analysis of 
variance measures for statistical differences between the means of groups whose data are categorical (as 
opposed to continuous). See William L. Hays, STATISTICS 376-81(5th ed. 1994). Throughout this Article, 
“significantly” refers to statistical significance, which denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis--the 
possibility of no differences between the various groups--at a probability level indicated by the p-value 
reported. Thus, “p” is defined as the probability of finding a difference or relationship between two groups as 
large as that observed if there were, in fact, no difference or relationship between them. William L. Hays, 
STATISTICS 267-82 (5th ed. 1994). 
69 F(1, 185) = 66.97, p < .001, ηp
2 =.266. Partial eta-squared (ηp
2) is a measure of the percent of total variance in 
the dependent variable accounted for by the independent variable, analogous to R2 in regression analysis. 
Interpretation is as follows: .01 small; .06 medium; .14 large.  
70 F(1, 186) = 68.66, p < .001, ηp
2 =.270. 
71 F(1, 185) = 127.43, p < .001, ηp
2 =.408. 
72 F(1, 186) = 55.32, p < .001, ηp
2 =.229. 













Figure 1. Mean ratings of Frank Brady’s role in the death of the two pilots, by moral 
character condition (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 1) 
  
 
Figure 2 illustrates perceptions of Frank Brady’s mental state, indicating the 
perceived controllability of the harm. When compared to participants in the Orchids 
condition, participants in the Meth condition perceived Frank Brady to be acting more 
intentionally73 and carelessly in losing control of the campfire.74 Participants in the Meth 
condition also perceived the deaths of the pilots to be more foreseeable.75 Not surprisingly, 
participants assigned to the Meth group also perceived Frank Brady as less likeable (M = 
1.84) than participants assigned to the Orchids group (M=3.65).76 
                                                 
73 F(1, 186) = 25.77, p < .001, ηp
2 =.122 
74 F(1, 183) = 7.67, p < .01, ηp
2 =.040 
75 F(1, 184) = 5.56, p < .05, ηp
2 =.029 
76 F(1, 184) = 125.08, p < .01, ηp
2 =.405 













Figure 2. Mean ratings of Frank Brady’s mental state in the death of the two pilots, by moral 
character condition (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 1) 
 
b. Judgments of the Pilot in Error 
 
After rating their perceptions of Frank Brady, participants were asked to think about 
the pilot who flew the wrong way. Interestingly, judgments of the pilot were the mirror 
image of judgments of Frank Brady, such that in the Meth condition the pilot was judged less 
harshly than in the Orchids condition.77 Mean ratings are illustrated in Figure 3.  
                                                 
77 Pilot responsible: F(1, 183) = 13.78, p < .01, ηp
2 =.070; Pilot negatively judged: F(1, 186) = 23.28, p < .01, 
ηp
2 =.111; Pilot to blame: F(1, 186) = 19.06, p < .01, ηp
2 =.093; Pilot the cause: F(1, 186) = 13.59, p < .01, ηp
2 
=.068 









Cause Responsible Negatively Judge Blame
Orchids Meth
 
Figure 3. Mean ratings of the pilot who flew the wrong way, by Frank Brady’s moral 
character (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 1) 
 
The reversed pattern in judgments of the pilot’s responsibility suggests that 
participants are perceiving a sort of conservation of responsibility, in which high 
responsibility for Frank Brady implies lower responsibility for the pilot in error, and vice 
versa. To illustrate this, we constructed single measures of perceived responsibility for both 
Frank Brady and for the pilot. Judgments regarding Frank Brady’s responsibility, negative 
judgment, blame, and share of causation were highly correlated78 as were those regarding the 
pilot.79 Using the mean of these scores for Frank Brady and the pilot, respectively, we 
constructed a single measure of Frank Brady’s responsibility, and a single measure of pilot 
responsibility. Interestingly, participants in the Meth condition seem to perceive reduced 
responsibility for the pilot who flew the wrong way, compared to participants in the Orchids 
condition. This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
                                                 
78 Cronbach’s alpha = .95. Cronbach's alpha measures the internal consistency of a set of items, and ranges 
between 0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher consistency. See Rick H. Hoyle, et al., RESEARCH 
METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 83-84 (7th ed. 2002). 
79 Cronbach’s alpha = .90. 




Figure 4. Mean perceived relative responsibility for the crash of Frank and of the pilot who 
flew the wrong way, by moral character condition (Experiment 1) 
 
 4. Discussion 
 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated that, even holding constant the severity of the harm and 
the trangressor’s mental state, judgments about the controllability of the harm and the 
trangressor’s responsibility – as well as the responsibility of other parties involved – vary 
extensively depending on the perceived moral character of the transgressor. In the version of 
the vignette where Frank Brady stored flammable chemicals to make methamphetamine, he 
was perceived as an unlikeable guy doing bad things, even though the fire started with an 
innocent campfire. Compared to the story where Brady was storing “innocent” orchid 
fertilizer, the consequences that followed from the actions of the “bad” Frank Brady were 
attributed as more blameworthy, as well as more intentional, causal, and foreseeable. 
Seemingly, a campfire accidentally started by a “bad guy” has more causal power and gives 
rise to more negative attributions than a campfire accidentally started by a “regular” person. 
 It must be noted, however, that the differences in foreseeability ratings give rise to a 
possible alternate explanation for the results. Even though both the chemicals for 
manufacturing the methamphetamine and the chemical fertilizers were both given identical 
descriptions of dangerousness – namely, “highly flammable” – it might be that participants 
perceived the methamphetamine chemicals to be more flammable or more dangerous than the 
fertilizer. Moreover, it might be that participants judged Frank Brady as more likely to 
anticipate a fire occurring with chemicals for methamphetamine than with chemicals for 
greenhouse fertilizer. After all, the process of methamphetamine manufacture has a general 
reputation for dangerousness; greenhouse fertilizers generally do not. To rule out this 
explanation, we conducted a separate experiment (Experiment 2) also involving the storage 
of flammable materials, in which we hold constant the material stored. 
Another question that arises about the results of this experiment is whether we 
successfully varied moral character. It stands to reason that a person who is manufacturing an 
illegal and dangerous drug like methamphetamine is perceived as having a worse moral 
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character than a person who is engaged in greenhouse gardening. Indeed, the difference in 
the likeability ratings in the two versions of the story we reported earlier confirms this notion. 
In the next experiment, we include additional measures designed to more directly measure 
the perceived moral character of the transgressor. 
Finally, there is a question about whether the observed trend in attributing more 
blame and controllability to a person with bad moral character also extends to attributing less 
blame and controllability to a person with good (as opposed to neutral) moral character. To 
address this, in the next experiment we include three versions of moral character: bad, 
neutral, and good. 
 




We recruited 195 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service, which 
allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population of users online. We paid participants 
50 cents for completing the survey, which took less than 5 minutes. Participants were assured 
that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying information would not be 
collected. Demographic characteristics were similar to the sample in Experiment 1. 
 
2. Design and Materials 
 
We randomly divided participants into three groups. One group read the “good 
character” version, one group read the “neutral character” version, and one group read the 
“bad character” version of the vignette reproduced below: 
 
Sam Norton used his backyard shed to store oxygen tanks. He knew the tanks posed a fire hazard, 
but he stored them there because 
 
[Daughter:] his young daughter has serious respiratory disease, and he provides around the clock 
care for her 
[Business:] he has just started his own business providing in-home delivery of healthcare 
equipment 
[Cheating Coach:] he is a high school football coach and administers oxygen to his players even 
though it provides an unfair advantage and is against the rules 
 
One night, some neighborhood youths were smoking cigarettes behind Sam Norton’s shed. One of 
them tossed a lit cigarette butt on the ground near the shed. Some dry leaves ignited, and soon 
after, the oxygen tanks in the shed exploded. One of the youths was killed in the explosion. 
 
Each participant read only one version of the vignette. After reading the vignette, 
participants were asked to provide their own personal opinion about Sam Norton and his role 
in the death of the youth. The measures were the same as those in Experiment 1, and were 
presented in random order, with the following exception. To check whether we successfully 
manipulated perceived moral character, we asked to what extent Sam Norton has a good 
moral character (1: not at all; 7: very much), is trustworthy (1: not at all; 7: very much), and 
is a bad or good person (1: bad person; 4: not sure; 7: good person). These questions about 
moral character were asked last, so as not to alert participants to the hypothesis of interest 
beforehand. 





We asked three questions to gauge the perceived moral character of Sam Norton.80 As 
expected, the Sam Norton who cares for his sick daughter was judged to be more moral in 
character,81 more trustworthy,82 and more of a good person,83 than Norton the businessman, 
who in turn was judged more favorably than Norton who cheats at football. 
Participants’ judgments of the extent to which Sam Norton is responsible,84 
blameworthy,85 and worthy of negative judgment,86 for the death of the youth differed 
significantly across moral character condition, as did his perceived causal role.87 The 
differences are in the direction expected, with Norton who takes care of his daughter the least 
blameworthy and causal, and the Norton who cheats at football the most blameworthy as 













Figure 5. Mean ratings of Sam Norton’s role in the death of the youth, by moral character 
condition (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 2) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6, Moral Character also influenced perceptions of 
intentionality, with Good Character leading to perceptions of lesser intentionality, but no 
                                                 
80 In the questionnaire, these questions were asked last, after all of the measures reported below. 
81 F(2, 192) = 38.60, p < .001, ηp
2 =.287. Daughter (M = 4.98); Business (M = 4.23); Cheating (M = 3.11). 
82 F(2, 192) = 37.98, p < .001, ηp
2 =.283. Daughter (M = 4.68); Business (M = 3.78); Cheating (M = 2.81). 
83 F(2, 191) = 30.05, p < .001, ηp
2 =.239. Daughter (M = 4.90); Business (M = 4.17); Cheating (M = 3.52). 
84 F(2, 192) = 13.12, p < .001, ηp
2 =.120.  
85 F(2, 191) = 18.63, p < .001, ηp
2 =.163. 
86 F(2, 192) = 21.47, p < .001, ηp
2 =.183. 
87 F(2, 191) = 12.84; p < .001, ηp
2 =.119. 
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differences between Neutral and Bad Character.88 There was no observed influence of Moral 











Figure 6. Mean ratings of Sam Norton’s mental state in the death of the youth, by moral 




In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of the first experiment, while providing 
more reliable controls for dangerousness of the act, as well as more directly measuring 
perceived moral character. As in the first experiment, we again found that a transgressor with 
a bad moral character is perceived as more blameworthy. Additionally, we found that a 
transgressor with a good moral character (as opposed to neutral) is less blameworthy, so that 
the moral character effect extends in both negative and positive directions, compared to the 
neutral midpoint. We again demonstrated that bad moral character gives rise to attributions of 
controllability, as demonstrated by the effect on perceived intent. It is noteworthy that good 
moral character had no observed effect on intent. 
 In demonstrating the role of moral character in the first two experiments, however, 
we did not separate the effects of motive or reason for acting. That is to say, in the bad moral 
character condition, the inference about character arose from the transgressor’s reason for 
storing the flammable materials; the same was true for good moral character. When a person 
disregards a substantial risk, and the nature and purpose of her conduct is not legitimate, the 
law recognizes such risk taking as the basis for criminal liability.90 On the other hand, when 
the disregard of a substantial risk is motivated by a laudatory purpose, the law might 
                                                 
88 F(2, 192) = 4.40, p < .05, ηp
2 =.044. 
89 F(2, 191) = 0.62, p =.54. 
90 See MPC 2.02(2)(c). 
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recognize the nature of the risk, as well as its disregard, as being legitimate and therefore 
insufficient to form the basis of criminal liability. Thus, Experiment 2 fails to distinguish the 
influence of moral character from the influence of motive or reason for disregarding a risk. 
The law does not consider moral character, standing alone, to form the basis for criminal 
liability; the law does, however, consider the nature and purpose of a person’s conduct when 
that person disregards a risk. To begin to try to tease these apart, the next experiment 




C. Experiment 3: Sara Davidson and the Dogs 
 
The previous experiments varied perceived moral character through a manipulation of the 
actor’s purpose for creating the hazardous condition. In Experiment 3, we sought to make the 
source of moral character more remote from the hazardous condition that was created. 
Additionally, we tested a second independent variable along with moral character. In this 
experiment we varied the extent to which the transgressor was aware that harm was likely. 
We hypothesized that offenders who were aware of and disregarded a risk of harm are 
perceived as more responsible and blameworthy than offenders who are not aware of risk – 
this prediction follows directly from criminal law theory. We also predicted that bad moral 
character can serve as a kind of proxy for awareness of risk, so that even when there is reason 
to believe a transgressor was unaware of a risk, she will be blamed as if she were aware if she 




We recruited 203 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service, 
which allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population of users online. We paid 
participants $1 for completing the survey, which took about 5 minutes to complete. 
Participants were assured that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying 
information would not be collected. A number of respondents failed to correctly respond to 
an instructional manipulation check91 and were thus excluded, leaving a final sample size of 
182 participants. Demographic characteristics were similar to the sample in Experiment 1. 
 
2.  Design and Materials 
 
We randomly divided participants into four groups. We independently varied two 
factors. The first was moral character (Bad; Good); the second was mental state (Aware; 
Unaware). Each participant read one version of the vignette reproduced below: 
 
[Good Character] Sara Davidson is a 39 year old woman who lives in a house with her two dogs. 
Sara has two young nieces whom she adores and sees often. She spoils them with birthday 
                                                 
91 See Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis & Nicolas Davidenko, Instructional manipulation checks: 
Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power, 45 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 867-872 
(2009). In our experiment, we asked “According to the story, to what extent did Sara Davidson realize that her 
dogs were not well behaved?” and asked respondents to choose one of two options: “Sara was NOT really 
aware of this” or “Sara was aware of this.” 
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presents and special outings. Sara spends much of her free time volunteering for various local 
charities. She tries to maintain a healthy lifestyle by eating well and exercising. She has many close 
friends and an active social life. 
 
[Bad Character] Sara Davidson is a 39 year old woman who lives in a house with her two dogs. 
Sara has two young nieces but she rarely sees them, and does not really like to spend time with 
them. She spends much of her free time watching trash-tv talk shows while smoking and eating 
junk food, even though she is aware that it’s not good for her blood sugar problem. She doesn’t 
socialize much and prefers to keep to herself.  
 
Sara’s dogs are not well behaved [and she is/ but she is not really] aware of this. They are in a 
fenced yard, but they sometimes escape and roam the neighborhood. On one occasion the dogs 
escaped and cornered two children, barking and growling. The children were unable to escape until 
a neighbor ran outside with a baseball bat and chased the dogs away. Even when fenced in the 
yard, the dogs growl and act aggressively toward people walking on the sidewalk. 
One morning while Sara was asleep, her dogs escaped and terrorized a neighbor who had just 
opened his garage door to leave for work. They circled the man’s truck and the man jumped in the 
truck to escape. His wife heard the yelling and chased them off by startling them with the noise of 
the automatic garage door. 
 
A few minutes later, two brothers, Chris and Travis, aged 8 and 11, were waiting at a school bus 
stop when they saw the dogs coming at them. They panicked and climbed up a tree; the dogs 
circled the tree, barking wildly. The dogs eventually headed down a ravine, and Chris climbed down 
to check and see where they were. The dogs circled back toward him and chased him. Just as the 
school bus approached, the dogs caught Chris and began mauling him, within view of the bus 
driver and the children. The driver called 911 but it was too late – Chris died from his injuries within 
minutes. 
 
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to provide their own personal 
opinion about Sara Davidson and her role in the death of the child. Specifically, participants 
were asked: To what extent is Sara Davidson responsible for the death of the boy; How 
negatively should Sara Davidson be judged for the death of the boy; How much blame goes 
to Sara Davidson for the death of the boy; To what extent did Sara Davidson cause the death 
of the boy; How intentional was Sara Davidson toward the death of the boy; From the 
perspective of someone in Sara Davidson's position, how foreseeable was the death of the 
boy. Questions were presented in random order, and were measured on a scale ranging from 
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
To check whether we successfully manipulated perceived moral character, we asked 
to what extent Sara Davidson has a good moral character (1: not at all; 7: very much), is 
trustworthy (1: not at all; 7: very much), and is a bad or good person (1: bad person; 4: not 




Responses to the three variables just described, which were used to check whether we 
successfully manipulated Sara Davidson’s perceived moral character, were all highly 
correlated, so we combined these three items to form a single measure of Moral Character 
(1:not at all; 7:very much).93 As expected, Sara Davidson’s moral character depended on 
whether she was described as sociable, generous, and healthy (in the good character 
                                                 
92 ANOVA was used for analyses, unless otherwise noted. 
93 Cronbach’s alpha = .92. 
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condition) or nonsociable and unhealthy on the other (in the bad character condition).94 This 
provides evidence that we successfully manipulated perceived moral character.95 
In this study, we manipulated moral character, as well as awareness of the risk of 
harm. We first examined the effect of moral character and of awareness on judgments of the 
extent to which Sara Davidson is responsible for the boy’s death, is worthy of negative 
judgment for the boy’s death, and is blameworthy for the boy’s death. These responses were 
highly correlated, so we combined them into a single measure of Overall Responsibility.96 
The means are illustrated in Figure 7. Sara Davidson was perceived as having more Overall 
Responsibility for the boy’s death if her character was bad than if it was good;97 and possibly 
if she was aware than if unaware.98 As is apparent from Figure 7, Unaware Sara is treated as 
if she was aware of the risk if her moral character is bad, but is assigned noticeably less 









Good Sara Bad Sara
 
                                                 
94 F(1, 181) =   152.01, p < .001, ηp
2 =.458; Mean (Good Character) = 4.40; Mean (Bad Character) = 
2.61. 
95 Note that we manipulated moral character, in part, by manipulating the food and exercise choices of the target 
person (Sara). There is some empirical evidence that eating specific types of foods (i.e., healthy v. unhealthy) 
gives rise to moral judgments about the eater. See, e.g., Richard I. Stein & Carol J. Nemeroff, Moral Overtones 
of Food: Judgments of Others Based on What They Eat, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990). 
Our manipulation check results (i.e., that Sara was seen as less moral based partly on food choices and exercise, 
is consistent with this evidence. See also, Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: 
Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1777 n. 467 (“…don’t run off and file a lawsuit if you are 
fat…. Look in the mirror because you’re the one to blame” (quoting Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, 
regarding the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act)).  
96 Cronbach’s alpha = .92. 
97 F(1, 181) = 10.77; p < .01; ηp
2 =.040. 
98 This difference was only marginally statistically significant. F(1, 181) = 4.32; p = .08; ηp
2 =.016. The 
interaction between moral character and awareness of risk was not statistically significant. F(1, 181) < 1. 
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Figure 7. Mean ratings of Sara Davidson’s overall responsibility in the death of the boy, by 
moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 3) 
 
Judgments of causation varied according to Sara Davidson’s awareness of risk,99 and 
possibly also by moral character,100 as illustrated in Figure 8. Awareness of risk played a 
clear role in judgments of causation; in addition, the Unaware Sara Davidson was perceived 









Good Sara Bad Sara
 
Figure 8. Extent to which Sara Davidson was perceived to have caused the boy’s death 
(1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 3). 
 
Participants were asked about the extent to which the boy’s death was intentional, and 
was foreseeable. Sara Davidson’s role in the boy’s death was perceived as more intentional if 
Sara’s character was bad,101 and if she was aware of the risk.102 These main effects were 
qualified by an interaction,103 illustrated in Figure 9. Sara Davidson with both bad character 
and awareness of risk was perceived as having acted intentionally, whereas lack of awareness 
or good character did not give rise to an inference of intentionality in the death of the boy. 
Finally, perceived foreseeability of the boy’s death varied, not surprisingly, by whether Sara 
Davidson was aware of the risk.104 There was no observed effect of moral character on 
perceptions of foreseeability, and no interaction between moral character and foreseeability. 
                                                 
99 F(1, 181) = 6.83; p < .01; ηp
2 =.036. 
100 This difference was only marginally statistically significant. F(1, 181) = 2.94; p = .08; ηp
2 =.016. The 
interaction between moral character and awareness of risk was not statistically significant. F(1, 181) < 1. 
101 F(1, 181) = 19.74; p < .001; ηp
2 =.091. 
102 F(1, 181) = 16.75; p < .001; ηp
2 =.077. 
103 F(1, 181) = 3.99; p < .05; ηp
2 =.018. 
104 F(1, 181) = 34.70; p < .001; ηp
2 =.162. 










Good Sara Bad Sara
 
       
Figure 9. Extent to which Sara Davidson was perceived to have acted intentionally toward 




In this third experiment, we attempted to more cleanly separate motive from character. In 
Experiment 1, the chemicals for manufacturing methamphetamine signaled Frank Brady’s 
bad moral character, but the chemicals also were his reason for creating the hazardous 
situation that started the fire and led to the pilots’ deaths. In Experiment 2, Sam Norton’s 
motive for storing the flammable oxygen signaled his moral character (bad, neutral, or good), 
but it was also the reason that created the hazardous situation that led to the explosion and the 
death. In Experiment 3, Sara Davidson’s traits of generosity, sociability, and even physical 
fitness, signaled her moral character. The hazardous situation she created was separate from 
the moral character signal. Thus, unlike in the first two experiments, Sara’s motive for 
creating the hazardous situation was independent from the earlier source for inferring moral 
character. Under these facts, the criminal law would permit an inference of liability based on 
the hazardous situation Sara created, but not based on her personality or lifestyle. Yet, 
participants viewed the boy’s death differently, depending on whether Sara was the type of 
person who ignores her nieces, sits alone watching trash tv and eating junk food on the one 
hand, or who spoils her nieces, volunteers, exercises, and watches her diet, on the other. 
Compared to “good” Sara, “bad” Sara was perceived not only as more responsible overall for 
the boy’s death. In accordance with criminal law theory, being aware of the risk that the dogs 
posed to people led to greater inferences about responsibility. Interestingly, the effects of bad 
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character are comparable to the effects of awareness: in this way, having a bad character is 
akin to being reckless to the extent that bad character gives rise to inferences about blame 
and responsibility, as well as causation. The intentionality data suggest that bad character 
motivates unfavorable inferences regarding mental state. Here, failure to safeguard unruly 
dogs was perceived as an intent to kill when the dog owner was not only aware of the risk but 
also a bad person.  
In this set of experiments, we have demonstrated empirically that perceptions of 
moral character sometimes influence judgments of blameworthiness. Aside from empirically 
demonstrating that moral character can in fact influence blame judgments, this set of studies 
makes several other contributions to the literature on blame and character. First, we replicate 
and extend Mark Alicke’s culpable control model105 – we demonstrated that negative blame 
judgments arise not only because of bad reasons for acting (Experiments 1 and 2), but also 
because of bad moral character that is signaled independently from reasons for acting 
(Experiment 3). Alicke argued that bad reasons for acting lead to greater perceptions of 
control and more extreme judgments about blame.106 Extending this model, we show 
additionally that bad character (apart from reasons for acting) influences control inferences 
(such as causation, intent, and foreseeability) and blame judgments. We suggest that this 
tendency is rooted in more general theories about motivated reasoning. Specifically, people 
are generally motivated to inculpate a defendant who they see as “bad” and this initial 
motivation leads them to interpret the defendant’s transgression in a way that makes it more 
legally blameworthy. Our results are consistent with the notion that bad moral character 
prompts inference to a desired conclusion, namely, increased blame. Judgments about greater 
causal influence and intent are also increased to justify the blame conclusion, which is likely 
to follow quickly and intuitively from the information about the severity of the harm and the 
moral character of the actor.  
To further explore the phenomenon of motivated inculpation, in the following section 
we discuss its implications for legal doctrine, with a specific focus on criminal law. 
 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL DOCTRINE 
 
The results of our experiments have implications that branch into two different 
strands. One is that an actor’s motive (along with its implicit suggestions about moral 
character) can strongly influence inferences about causation, intent, and blame. The second is 
that moral character, inferred independently from motive for creating harm (or the conditions 
that led to harm) can influence judgments about causation, intent, and blame. Our findings 
are most consequential in legal situations when character or motive information is most 
likely to enter the process. In this Article, we have concentrated on criminal cases, but 
character and motive can potentially sway judgments in any kind of case. For example, an 
employer being sued for discrimination might introduce evidence that the employee has a 
history of cocaine use, either to provide a non-discriminatory reason for firing or simply to 
try to undercut the employee’s claim for emotional distress damages. Our experiments focus 
on blame attributions for acts that the law treats as criminal, and so we focus our discussion 
of implications on criminal law and related issues in evidence. We specifically examine the 
                                                 
105 Alicke, supra note 29. 
106 Id. 
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implications of our finding for felony murder, evidentiary issues in sexual assault, criminal 
statutory interpretation, and causation.  
 
A. Motive and Felony Murder 
 
In the first two experiments reported, bad motive was associated with more severe 
judgments of blame and responsibility, compared to good motive. These findings mapping 
intuitive notions of blame correspond well with modern definitions of mens rea. The general 
hierarchy of mens rea107 corresponds to strongly held intuitions. The criminal law categorizes 
intentional killings, for example, as more serious than reckless killings, which are in turn 
more serious than negligent killings. Likewise, outside of a legal context we are more 
inclined psychologically to blame (or inclined to blame more harshly) when a transgressor 
acted intentionally, as opposed to recklessly or negligently.108 This hierarchy is so deeply 
ingrained that even young children invoke it to mitigate their own responsibility for harm.109  
Historical conceptions of mens rea required finding an evil purpose in order to 
impose liability – terms like “vicious will,” “wickedness,” and “malevolence” were common 
occurrences in judicial opinions. One prominent manifestation of this idea is traditional 
felony murder doctrine, in which unforeseen deaths are treated as murder. The basis for this 
treatment is the malice that is implicit in the underlying felony. The implication underlying 
the doctrine is that in committing the felony, the defendant acted with an evil mind or evil 
purpose, so that in doing a bad act the felon has no standing to complain about being 
punished for the harmful consequences. This historical conception of mens rea as malice or 
bad motive is consistent with the results from the first two experiments, showing that bad 
motive is sufficient, in some circumstances, to justify blame for the harmful consequence, 
even if that consequence is unanticipated.  
Accordingly, public support for the felony murder rule may stem from the intuition 
that anyone committing a felony is by definition acting with an evil motive, which in itself 
justifies liability for ensuing harm, even an unforeseen death. By contrast, an innocent person 
involved in an innocent activity that leads to a death is usually deemed as simply being 
involved in an accident. But that accident becomes criminally blameworthy when the person 
involved is engaged in a morally blameworthy activity.110 Felony murder, therefore, is 
designed to protect society from people acting for bad reasons – those who are engaging in 
dangerous felonies that demonstrate a willingness to harm others. A defendant who can 
demonstrate that he was really acting for good reasons, but got caught up in producing a 
dangerous situation is much less likely to be found blameworthy. 
                                                 
107 i.e., purposely (intentionally), knowingly, recklessly, negligently. These are referred to as “culpability 
levels,” in Model Penal Code terminology. 
108 Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001); John M. Darley et al., Doing Wrong Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMP. 
LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010). Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? 
Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment,83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002). 
109 E.g., “But I didn’t mean to!” 
110 See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our 
Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (1994). 
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 Conversely, absence of evil motive often motivates recognition of various defenses in 
criminal law.111 Most notably, duress is based on the notion that punishment is unjustly 
imposed on those who acted out of fear for themselves or their loved ones, rather than 
because of any evil motivation. Similarly, self-defense is permitted as a defense to liability 
when a defendant can show that he harmed another to avoid harm to himself, rather than for a 
reason reflecting an evil motive.  
 
B. Moral Character and Implicit Mental State Requirements 
 
Aspects of motive commonly come into play as necessary to understand a defendant’s 
mental state, especially where mental state requirements use normatively-valenced 
descriptors like “vicious will,” “wickedness,” and “malevolence.” But, although these terms 
might indicate an implicit requirement of bad motive, they might also indicate an implicit 
judgment of bad moral character.112 Historically, certain crimes involved acts that were 
viewed as so inherently wrongful that mens rea was essentially self proving, because any 
person who would do such an act was assumed to have acted with a bad intent. Thus, for 
example, if I intentionally shoot a gun at someone and they are killed by my bullet, my 
malicious intent is implicit in my decision to shoot at them. I cannot make a viable claim that 
it was my intent only to injure them, so that their death was only negligent. 
There is reason to think that the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly held onto this 
distinction.  In cases where the defendant might plausibly offer a version of events where he 
was a good guy who got caught up in a bad situation, the Court is more demanding of the 
government and will more readily read in a specific mens rea requirement, even when it does 
not appear in the statute being applied. Professor Joseph E. Kennedy has argued that this 
explains the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Staples v. US, in which the Court read a 
knowledge requirement into a statute criminalizing conduct that could arguably be 
innocent.113 On the other hand, when the crime involves an inherently wrongful actus reus 
(e.g., robbery) the Court is hesitant to impose a mental state requirement when it does not 
explicitly appear in the statute.114 “In this sense, only those of good character need apply for 
relief under Staples.”115  
 
C. Moral Character in Evidence 
 
Our experiments also have particularly potent practical implications for the treatment 
of character evidence in criminal trials. Our findings highlight the highly influential potential 
                                                 
111 See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past 
and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 641-667. 
112 511 U.S. 60 (1994). The criminal action at question in this case was for the possession of a weapon capable 
of automatically firing. The defendant Staples did not dispute his possession of the weapon, but rather claimed 
that he was unaware of the weapon’s ability to fire automatically.  For a discussion of the role of character in 
this case, see Joseph E. Kennedy, The Story of Staples v. United States and the Innocent Machine Gun Owner: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Dangerous (April 26, 2010). UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1596222. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596222; SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, HOW CRIMINAL LAW WORKS: A 
CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL GUIDE 84 (2009). (“The language was that of character judgment, and courts 
assumed that in judging the criminal conduct they were making character assessments as well.”) 
113 See Kennedy, supra. 
114 Id. at 35-36 
115 Id. 
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of evidence of bad character, even when it is only tangentially related to the crime at hand. 
Our results provide further substantiation of the concerns expressed by the judges that first 
crafted and applied the common law ban on character evidence.116 These findings are also 
consistent with other empirical work suggesting that the likelihood of conviction increases if 
prior crimes are admitted into evidence.117  
Restrictions on character evidence are primarily targeted at evidence meant to prove 
the defendant’s probability of conforming to a bad moral character. 118 However, several 
exceptions to this general rule exist. For example, Congress and several states allow evidence 
of any past sexual transgressions to be admitted in cases involving child molestation and 
sexual assault.119 A few states allow the presentation of propensity evidence in cases 
involving domestic abuse.120 Also, if a defendant chooses to participate as a witness, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence allow the prosecutor to present character evidence in the form of 
“[o]pinion and reputation evidence” that impugns the credibility of the witnesses.121 And, as 
discussed above, some character evidence can be introduced as motive in order to prove 
mens rea. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly classify evidence relating to 
motive as “non-character,”122 juries are likely to extrapolate information about character from 
evidence about a person’s priorities, choices, and motivations.123 Thus, “what we regulate as 
‘character evidence’ is only a small part of the evidence and arguments that lawyers use to 
develop competing versions of the characters… in the events that are subject to litigation.”124 
Despite procedural efforts to control the influence of character evidence in criminal trials, 
therefore, the competing narratives that prosecutors and defense attorneys use in criminal 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., State v. Lepage, 57 N.H. 245, 289 (1876) (“[T]he very fact that a man is charged with a crime is 
sufficient to create in many minds a belief that he is guilty. It is quite inconsistent with that fairness of trial to 
which every man is entitled, that the jury should be prejudiced against him by any evidence except what relates 
to the issue; above all should not be permitted to blacken his character….”). 
117 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior 
Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1357, 1380–
85 (2009) (finding a significant association between the jury’s learning of a criminal record and conviction in 
cases with weak evidence). 
118 See Normal Krivosha, Thomas Lansworth & Pennie Pirsch, Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Using 
Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REV. 657, 664 (1981) (tracing the roots 
of the common law ban on character evidence to the 1810 case of Rex v. Cole); FED. R. EVID. 413-14 
(“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion….”). See also Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact 
Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 989 (1938); KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §186, 
at 311 (6th e.d. 2006); Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus “What was Done”: When to Admit Character 
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 939, 941 (2001). 
119
 FED. R. EVID. 413-415. See also Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L.127, 159 (1993). 
120 See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 IND. L. REV. 
687, 700-02, n. 44 (2003). 
121 FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
122 FED. R. EVID. 409(b). 
123 See, e.g., Peter Tillers, What is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 810, 825 
(suggesting that a connection exists between motive and character insofar as “[h]uman creatures have an 
internal system of rules, principles, or operations that regulates or organizes their behavior.… [and] it is 
logically permissible to suppose that ‘character’ is ‘caused’ by matters such as ‘choice’ and ‘decision’); Roger 
C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 754-55. 
124 Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability Insurance, 49 
HASTINGS L. J. 843, 845-46 (1998).  
DRAFT OF APRIL 11, 2011 
 31
cases are largely concerned with conveying a distinct impression of the character of the 
parties involved in the case.125 Thus, characterizations about the moral character of the 
parties continue to enter trials in various ways.126 
 
D. Moral Character and Proximate Cause 
 
One distinctive feature of the vignettes tested in these experiments is they all involved 
a force that intervened between the actors’ initial action and the harm. For Frank Brady, a 
negligent pilot flew in the wrong direction; for Sam Norton, a youth tossed a burning 
cigarette butt onto dry leaves; for Sara Davidson, her dogs attacked the boy. These types of 
situations raise the issue of proximate cause, a doctrine that helps sort those causes that are 
blameworthy from those that are too remote.127 As a doctrine, proximate cause is notorious 
for its lack of specific standards to guide outcomes; instead, the analysis is based heavily on 
fairness considerations. Yet, a cursory look at familiar criminal law proximate cause cases is 
revealing when viewed through the lens of moral character and motive, rather than more 
traditional notions of remoteness and foreseeability. For example, in a case where the 
defendants robbed the victim and left him passed out drunk on the side of a dark rural 
highway, the court found that the robbers proximately caused the victim’s death after he was 
run over by a passing car.128 In another case, the defendant led police on a dangerous 48-mile 
high speed chase, resulting in the death of a police helicopter pilot; the appellate court upheld 
the finding of proximate cause.129 But where the defendant had participated in a drag race 
where both cars crashed through a guardrail, leading to the death of the other participant, the 
appellate court reversed the conviction on proximate cause grounds.130 Arguably, these 
results fit within the pattern found in the experiments: the worse the moral character of the 
defendant, the more likely we are to hold him liable. Admittedly, this is an extremely small, 
non-randomly selected sample of proximate cause cases. Note, however, that causation was 
one of the attributes rated by the participants in the experiments: in both experiments, bad 
moral character led to higher ratings of causation. Thus, it may be that proximate cause 
judgments follow on the heels of intuitive judgments about blame.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
In these experimental studies, we demonstrated that a transgressor’s motive for acting 
can influence judgments of blame, responsibility, causation, and intention. We also showed 
that perceptions of a transgressor’s moral character can influence judgments of blame, 
responsibility, causation, and intention. We certainly do not claim, however, that motive and 
                                                 
125 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 738 (1997) (characterizing trials as 
competitions between stories, where “[p]laintiff and defendant in a trial each tell a story… and the jury chooses 
the story that it likes better”); Jim M. Perdue, Winning with Stories, 69 TEX. B.J. 894, 990 (2006) (arguing that 
“[a] trial story is all about character.”); Kenworthey Bilz, We Don't Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and 
the Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 429.  
126 For a discussion of the myriad ways in which character evidence leaks into criminal cases despite its 
prohibition, see, e.g., Tillers, supra note 123; Park, supra note 123. 
127 Welch v. State, 235 So.2d 906 (1970) (“Mankind might still be in Eden, but for Adam’s biting an apple.”). 
128 Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493 (1976). 
129 People v. Acosta, 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1991). 
130 Velasquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347 (1990). 
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moral character always exert influence on blame related judgments. The influence of motive 
and moral character is subject to limitations, and we have not yet explored the contours of 
these boundary conditions. One likely limitation on the relationship between motive and 
moral character on the one hand, and blame related judgments on the other, is intentionality. 
Note that the harm in each of the three experiments reported here was caused unintentionally: 
Frank Brady stored flammable chemicals which led to the unintentional death of a firefighter; 
Sam Norton stored oxygen which led to the unintentional death of the youth; Sara Davidson 
kept unruly and dangerous dogs which led to the death of a child that she in no way intended. 
These narrow circumstances of recklessly or negligently caused deaths contain features that 
tip the blaming process toward consideration of motive and moral character. We will discuss 
a few of them here. 
First, when the harm of a transgression is severe, as is the case when a victim dies, 
our drive to blame kicks into high gear.131 More severe harm results not only in more severe 
judgments of punishment, but also a greater likelihood of finding that the actor is responsible 
for the consequences of their harmful action.132 For example, when people read a story about 
a bank robber whose bullet misses the teller but ricochets and hits a customer, they are likely 
to judge the robber as more responsible, more reckless, and his action more causal, when the 
injury is severe as opposed to mild.133 A harm-based version of retributivism can explain 
why punishment should increase with severity of harm. That liability judgments should 
become more likely with severity of harm is more puzzling, but nonetheless consonant with 
the notion that we generally treat more severe harm more harshly.134 Thus, in our three 
experiments, perceivers were highly motivated to blame, and as a result, were especially 
motivated to search for information that could justify this impulse. Bad motive and bad 
character might have fit this need. 
Second, none of the trangressors in our experiments acted intentionally in causing 
harm. When mental state is ambiguous, it can be difficult to gauge the blameworthiness of 
the actor. When a wrongdoer kills another person intentionally, we know to assign a great 
deal of blame, and the wrongdoer’s moral character would likely have minimal influence on 
blame perceptions. Note here that we are discussing judgments of blame and responsibility, 
rather than punishment judgments.135 A cold-blooded killer who is perceived as having a 
                                                 
131 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of “Responsibility”: A Meta-Analytic Review, 
J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 2575 (2000); Solan & Darley, supra note 108. 
132 Id. But see Loran F. Nordgren and Mary-Hunter Morris McDonnell, The Scope-Severity Paradox: Why 
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133 See Chimaeze D. Ugwuegbu & Clyde Hendrick, Personal Causality and Attributions of Responsibility, 2 
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reserve the right to compensate should the injury materialize (via an escrow mechanism). See Darley et al., 
supra note 108. 
135 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors? 88 B.U.L. Rev. 1109 
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good character might receive less punishment than if his character is perceived as bad; but 
judgments of responsibility and blame for the killing might not reflect any difference in 
moral character.136 
Turning from moral character to motive, the picture likely changes, at least to some 
degree. The influence of motive on blame judgments could perhaps still emerge in the 
context of intentionally causing death. A person who kills another out of greed (e.g., for 
inheritance money) might be perceived as more blameworthy than one who is driven by 
mercy (e.g., killing a terminally ill and suffering loved one). This will be an important 
question to explore in future work, and for now we are limited to mere speculation. Outside 
of this extreme example, however, it may be that the influence of motive on blame judgments 
is greatly attenuated when the transgressor acts intentionally, because the intentional mental 
state overwhelms other influences like motive and moral character. 
Our analysis of boundary conditions is speculative, but is supported by findings in the 
context of the influence of propensity evidence (such as prior crimes) on jury verdicts. Recall 
that Eisenberg & Hans found that juries who learned of a defendant’s prior criminal record 
were more likely to convict, but only when the overall evidence was relatively weak. Thus, 
the weight of other factors can easily overwhelm the influence of similar prior acts, and by 
extension, perhaps also the influence of moral character and motive on guilt judgments and 
blame judgments. 
The twin notions of guilt and blame give rise, perhaps surprisingly, to an important 
distinction. The propensity studies discussed in the beginning of this Article suggest that 
learning about a criminal defendant’s prior crimes can increase the likelihood of a guilty 
verdict in the current case. These findings are subject to certain limitations. For example, if 
the prior crime is very dissimilar, or is not serious, the influence of the propensity 
information on verdict diminishes or disappears. Likewise, the influence of propensity 
information on initial individual juror preferences can dissipate when jurors deliberate and 
reach a group verdict.137 Taken as a whole, the focus of this body of research is different, and 
also more specific, than our aim in the experiments we discuss in this Article. Whereas the 
propensity studies focus on the influence of prior crimes, our focus is on the influence of two 
constructs that are broader in scope: moral character and motive. It may well be the case that 
prior crimes serve as a proxy for moral character information, so that prior crimes is simply a 
subset of the set of information that gives rise to inferences about moral character. It might 
alternatively be the case that the influence of prior crimes also works through a slightly 
different mechanism that draws more on processes of analogical reasoning than does the 
influence of moral character. Recall that the seriousness of prior crime is not the only 
dimension along which the influence of prior crimes varies; similarity of prior crime might 
well be an influence that operates independently of seriousness. Although the seriousness of 
prior crime could logically be interpreted as a proxy for moral character, this is unlikely to be 
the case with regard to crime similarity, as an independent dimension.  
The important point in this Article is that the focus of the experiments reported here is 
quite different than the focus of the earlier research on prior crimes as propensity evidence. 
In addition, the objects of influence are different in our research as well. The earlier 
propensity evidence studies focused almost exclusively on judgments of guilt – either in the 
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form of individual mock juror judgments, or verdicts of mock juries. In the current 
experiments, by contrast, we are interested not specifically in guilt judgments or punishment, 
but rather in basic psychological processes of blame and responsibility. These basic 
processes play a key role in verdicts, to be sure. But their importance goes beyond modeling 
jury behavior. Intuitive judgments of blame and responsibility are made very quickly, and 
probably automatically, as the perceiver first processes the story about the transgression.138 
Our initial inclinations about whether to categorize the person that we are judging as “good” 
or “bad” can motivate us to blame or exculpate them. This initial motivation, in turn, can 
influence our interpretation of the person’s actions in a way that allows us to excuse their 
responsibility or find them blameworthy for the harm they caused. These quick, initial, 
intuitive blame judgments are also likely to play a key role in how potential litigants perceive 
a harm-relevant event, how parties approach dispute resolution processes, and outside of the 
legal system, how ordinary people interact when faced with a perceived wrong. But, as 
demonstrated by our studies in this Article, motivated inculpation can also enter into the 
criminal context, where law has tried -- through the imposition of formalized processes -- to 
separate liability from character-based inferences. Even here, when all other aspects of the 
harm caused by an action and the situation in which it occurred are held constant, the actor’s 
perceived moral character or bad reasons for acting can color the way that we determine 
discrete components of criminal liability like knowledge, mental state, and forseeability.  
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